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The Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh
Amendment: An Uncertain Boundary
Between Federalism and State
Sovereignty
By DANIEL A. AUSTIN*
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking
authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against un-
consenting States.'
The ineluctable conclusion, then, is that States agreed in the plan
of the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense
they might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to "Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies." 2
Introduction
THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE of Article I of the Constitution3 lives
in uneasy coexistence with state sovereignty. The Bankruptcy Clause
provides Congress with the authority to establish "uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."'4 Legal tra-
dition, embodied in the Constitution by the Eleventh Amendment,
5
holds states immune from suit by citizens absent the state's consent.
There are, nonetheless, many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that
permit litigation to recover assets of the debtor or to administer the
debtor's estate. These include suits by debtors or trustees against cred-
itors, suits by creditors against the debtor, and suits against third par-
ties.6 States or state agencies are interested parties in almost every
* Daniel A. Austin is a lawyer in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He thanks Wendy W.
Austin, Emily F. Gibb, Joachim Thomas, and Nick Warren for their valuable assistance.
1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
2. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 377 (2006).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
4. Id.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
6. A bankruptcy trustee (including a trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation as well as a
trustee in a reorganization under chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13) may request the bankruptcy
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bankruptcy and are frequently litigants because of their relationship
to the debtor. The Bankruptcy Code generally does not differentiate
between state and non-state actors, and section 106 of the Code ex-
pressly abrogates state immunity for most types of bankruptcy litiga-
tion. 7 These provisions come into conflict with the Eleventh
Amendment.
The tension between bankruptcy jurisdiction and state immunity
has been a heated issue in a number of court cases. There is no major-
ity consensus on this subject, but the opposing positions-preemi-
nence of a federal bankruptcy system versus strict application of state
immunity-are clear, and their arguments exhaustively developed.
The most recent Supreme Court decision on this matter is Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz.8 In a five-to-four decision, the Court
permitted a bankruptcy trustee to sue the State of Virginia to recover
assets of the bankruptcy estate because states had consented to suit
when they ratified the Bankruptcy Clause. 9 The Katz decision stunned
observers because it essentially reversed the Court's decision ten years
earlier in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.10 Seminole Tribe held that
Congress did not have authority to abrogate state immunity when leg-
court to avoid certain types of pre- and post-petition liens and transfers of property that are
prejudicial to the bankruptcy estate. The types of liens and transfers subject to the trustee's
"avoidance" powers are set forth in Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 544-549 (2000), and include, inter alia, transfers that could otherwise be avoidable by a
secured creditor in the ordinary course of business, § 544, statutory liens that become fixed
due to insolvency, § 545, fraudulent transfers made to third parties or "insiders" for less
than fair value in order to move assets out of the reach of legitimate creditors, § 548, and
post-petition transfers not authorized by the bankruptcy court, § 549. The most common
use of the trustee's avoidance powers is "preferential transfers" under section 547. A prefer-
ential transfer is a transfer made for the benefit of a creditor on account of an antecedent
(pre-petition) debt within the ninety days immediately prior to the petition date (one year
if the transferee is an insider) and while the debtor is insolvent, and which enables the
creditor to receive more than the creditor would have received in a liquidation or if the
transfer had not been made. Id. § 547. There are several defenses to a preference action set
forth in section 547, and much of the litigation over preference deals with whether the
transfer at issue in the case falls within one of the defenses.
An avoidance action is commenced as an "adversary proceeding" under Bankruptcy
Rule 7003 and acts as a separate litigation within the underlying bankruptcy case. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7003. If the bankruptcy court rules that a lien or transfer is avoided, section 550
provides that "the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property trans-
ferred, or . . . the value of such property." 11 U.S.C. § 550. Thus, exercise of the bank-
ruptcy trustee's avoidance power typically involves two steps: first, adjudication that the
transfer is avoidable under sections 544 through 549, and second, recovery of the funds or
res by the trustee pursuant to section 550.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
8. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
9. Id. at 377-78.
10. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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islating pursuant to Article I. 1 After Seminole Tribe, it was generally
assumed that sovereign immunity would apply to bankruptcy. 12 Semi-
nole Tribe, however, was also a five-to-four decision, and in light of the
result in Katz, the boundary between state immunity and bankruptcy
jurisdiction is clearly not fixed.
This Article will examine the conflict between the Bankruptcy
Code and state sovereignty. The Article shows that while state substan-
tive law is extensively incorporated into federal bankruptcy law, the
Bankruptcy Code prevails over state sovereign immunity when apply-
ing bankruptcy law. In other words, under the presentjudicial regime,
the Bankruptcy Code presents a glaring exception to the otherwise
firm rule of state sovereignty.
Part I examines the Bankruptcy Clause and several national bank-
ruptcy statutes, including the current Bankruptcy Code. This discus-
sion includes an explanation of how the Bankruptcy Clause sits within
the framework of the Supremacy Clause.1 3 Part II discusses the doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity as embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment and as applied in key cases. This part highlights the ten-
sion between court majorities that interpret federal powers broadly,
and those that favor strict application of Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity. Part III then considers this controversy in the context of national
bankruptcy law, where the conflict is particularly sharp and enduring,
and the majorities on either side are razor thin. The Article concludes
in Part IV with a look at the future of bankruptcy law and state sover-
eignty under the rule of Katz and suggests that Katz might not be such
a radical departure from the Eleventh Amendment after all.
I. Bankruptcy and the Constitution
A. The Bankruptcy Clause
The Bankruptcy Clause, contained in Article I, Section 8, clause 4
of the Constitution, reads simply enough: "The Congress shall have
11. Id. at 72-73.
12. See, e.g., Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immu-
nity: Limiting the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BAuNue. L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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power... [t]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."'14
There is little in the record of the history of the Bankruptcy
Clause.' 5 One known fact, however, is that one of the Framers' con-
cerns was the patchwork of bankruptcy laws (or lack of them) among
the states in the early republic. 16
Emblematic of the Framers' concern was the disparate treatment
between the debtors in the cases of James v. Allen17 and Millar v. Hall.I "
In James, a debtor who had been released from prison in New Jersey
traveled to Pennsylvania, where he was arrested for nonpayment of a
Pennsylvania debt.' 9 The Pennsylvania court ruled that the NewJersey
discharge did no more than release the debtor from the county gaol
where he was imprisoned, but did not authorize a subsequent dis-
charge anywhere else. 20 The court in Millar, however, ruled the oppo-
site, holding that a debtor discharged in Maryland could not
thereafter be imprisoned for a Pennsylvania debt, since, having been
"obliged to transfer his effects for the benefit of all his creditors ...
[the debtor was] deprived of every means of payment."21
In drafting the Bankruptcy Clause, the Framers intended for
United States bankruptcy law to have expansive application, well be-
yond the limited purpose of insolvency statutes under English law. 22
English bankruptcy law, from the time of Henry VIII, was intended
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
15. Many believe that it was drafted by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and passed
late in the Constitutional Convention Proceedings after very little debate. Jonathon C. Lip-
son, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 12-14), available at http://Isr.nellco.org/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=I153&context-upenn/wps. Lipson's article provides a concise over-
view of facts and authorities on the history of the Bankruptcy Clause.
16. Some states had no insolvency laws, while others provided for release from
debtor's prison, but not for discharge of debt. BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 55, 59-60 (2002). Pennsylvania had an
actual bankruptcy law which permitted discharge of unpaid debts, but only to commercial
debtors. Id.
17. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 188 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1786).
18. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 229 (Pa. 1788).
19. James, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 188.
20. Id. at 192.
21. Millar, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 232, cited in Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,
368 (2006). In the time-honored tradition of legal practice, the lawyer for the debtor Mil-
lar, Jared Ingersoll, made exactly the opposite argument when he represented the State of
Pennsylvania in James. Id. at 229. The majority in Katz would cite these two cases over two
hundred years later. Katz, 546 U.S. at 366-86.
22. In re Klein, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 277 (1843) (holding that the extent of Congress's
power under the Bankruptcy Clause is not limited to the principles of English bankruptcy
law).
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primarily to protect the interests of trade creditors, as debtors were
considered to be criminals. 23 In contrast, United States bankruptcy
law at an early point not only protected trade creditors against debtor
fraud, but also "rescue [d] the honest but unfortunate insolvent from
the oppression of a vindictive creditor."24 As Justice Sutherland noted,
"From the beginning, the tendency of legislation and of judicial inter-
pretation has been uniformly in the direction of progressive liberaliza-
tion in respect of the operation of the bankruptcy power." 25 That is
still the focus of American bankruptcy law today.26
B. Federal Bankruptcy Statutes
1. Pre-Bankruptcy Code Acts
Chief Justice Marshall considered the scope of congressional
power under the Bankruptcy Clause to be broad: "The peculiar terms
of the grant [in the Bankruptcy Clause] certainly deserve notice. Con-
gress is not authorized merely to pass laws, the operation of which
shall be uniform, but to establish uniform laws on the subject
throughout the United States. '27 Notwithstanding, Congress used this
power sparingly during the first one hundred years of the republic
and only in response to economic pressures.
The first law enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause was the
Bankruptcy Act of 180028 ("Act of 1800"), passed by Federalists in the
wake of the Panic of 1797.29 The Act of 1800 expanded upon English
23. See MANN, supra note 16, at 46; see generally Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the
Bankruptcy Clause, I AM. J. LEcAL HIST. 215 (1957).
24. Statement of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist party member and early U.S. Repre-
sentative in debates regarding the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1800, cited in MANN, supra
note 16, at 212 (quoting 9 Annals of Cong. 2660, 2675 (1799)).
25. Cont'l Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 668 (1935).
26. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (holding that a key purpose of
bankruptcy law is to give debtors "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt"); accord Har-
ris v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S.
605, 617 (1918). Bankruptcy law does not preempt other rights under the Constitution.
For example, oral testimony that is compelled pursuant to bankruptcy authority may not
be used for self-incrimination. 11 U.S.C § 344 (2000). Creditors cannot be denied the right
of due process. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589, 602 (1935).
27. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193-94 (1819).
28. Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of 1803, ch. 6, 25 Stat. 248.
29. Erik Bergl6f & Howard Rosenthal, Power Rejected: Congress and Bankruptcy in
the Early Republic 5 (May 31, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
finance.ox.ac.uk/NR/rdonlyres/0FCCE7A6-408E-4E1D-B224-DB33C9DAA4A9/0/howard
rosenthalPowerRejected7.pdf. The Panic of 1797 started with the contraction of credit in
Europe incident to the outbreak of war in 1793. DAVID J. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCy LAw IN AMERICA 202-04 (2001). Additionally, depravation on
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law by including traders, bankers, brokers, and underwriters as lawful
debtors in insolvency proceedings.30 Although it eliminated debtor's
prisons, 31 the Act of 1800 had little impact otherwise for most people
and was repealed in 1803.32
The Bankruptcy Act of 184133 ("Act of 1841") followed the Panic
of 1837. 34 The law added merchants and corporations to bankruptcy
law coverage and, for the first time, provided for voluntary petitions
and rehabilitation of the debtor.35 In 1843, the same Congress that
passed the Act of 1841 also repealed it.36 During the year the Act of
1841 was in effect, however, there were 40,000 bankruptcy filings, rep-
resenting one percent of the total adult male population of the
United States.37
The nation's third bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 186738
("Act of 1867"), was passed in the aftermath of the Civil War.39 The
scope of persons that file bankruptcy was expanded to include almost
all persons and corporations, and for the first time, a debtor was per-
mitted to propose terms that would be binding upon creditors, if ap-
proved by a majority of creditors. 40 Congress repealed the Act of 1867
in 1872.41
American shipping disrupted American commerce, further driving up the cost of money.
Id. Holders of private notes, which were ubiquitous during an era of primitive banking,
suddenly looked to the guarantors for payment, most of who could not pay. Id. Businesses
failed, and hundreds of otherwise reputable merchants went to prison or fled to avoid
creditors. Id.
30. MANN, supra note 16, at 253.
31. The Act's most significant result may have been to release Robert Morris, signer of
the Declaration of Independence and member of the Constitutional Convention, from
debtor's prison in Philadelphia. Id.
32. Id.
33. Ch. 9, 5 stat. 440, repealed by Act of 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
34. SKEEL, supra note 29, at 25. The panic of 1837 was caused by the sudden collapse
in the value of unregulated paper notes, much of it issued by states to encourage settle-
ment. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52-55 (1935). Easy credit
caused widespread speculation in land and commodities, leading in turn to inflation, then
more paper notes, and eventually the value of the notes fell. Id. Thousands of banks and
businesses closed, and the country went into depression. Id.
35. WARREN, supra note 34, at 60, 66 (1935).
36. Id. at 81.
37. Id. at 86. Given that the law did not apply to agrarian debtors or to laborers (the
vast majority of American workers at the time), this is a significant number.
38. Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178.
39. WARREN, supra note 34, at 103-09.
40. In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11673).
41. Ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178.
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The Bankruptcy Act of 189842 ("Act of 1898") was the nation's
first "permanent" bankruptcy law. The Act of 1898 established rules
for corporate reorganization, which at that time was a new concept.4
3
The law provided for an adversarial system in which referees played
mostly an adjudicative function, with the process left mostly to the
parties themselves. 44 Later, the 1938 Chandler Act45 ("Chandler Act")
introduced consumer repayment plans and gave referees authority to
grant discharges. 46 The Chandler Act gave rise to an efficient bank-
ruptcy bar administration, but many viewed the bankruptcy process as
prone to collusion and obscure to outsiders. 47
2. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and Recent Amendments
The Bankruptcy Code of 197848 ("Code") is the current national
bankruptcy law. The Code accommodates individual, business, farm,
railroad, and municipal bankruptcy. 49 The Code is fluid, with new sec-
tions added or existing ones modified as Congress deems necessary to
respond to changing national needs. For example, when passed, chap-
ter 11 of the Code had detailed provisions for corporate reorganiza-
tion.50 Section 1113,' however, which places restrictions on the ability
of a business debtor to modify collective bargaining agreements, was
added in 1984 in response to the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco.5 2 Section 111453 was included in 1988 after the
42. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), re-
pealed by Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
43. SKEEL, supra note 29, at 58-60.
44. Id. at 43.
45. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 838.
46. SKEEL, supra note 29, at 131.
47. Id. at 67-70, 131, 133.
48. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-112, 301-308, 321-333, 341-351, 361-366, 701-707, 721-727, 741-753, 761-767,
781-784, 901-904, 921-930, 941-946, 1101-1116, 1121-1129, 1141-1146, 1161-1174,
1201-1208, 1221-1231, 1301-1308, 1321-1330, 1501-1532 (2000)).
49. Individual debtors may file under chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 109(B) (2000) (liquida-
tion), chapter 13, § 109(e) (adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income), and
chapter 11, § 109(d) (reorganization). Businesses may file under chapter 7, § 109(B),
chapter 11, § 109(d), and chapter 15, § 1501 (cross-border bankruptcies). Chapter 12,
§ 109(f), is for family farmers and family fishermen, while railroads may file under a special
subchapter of chapter 11, § 109(d), and chapter 9, § 109(c), is for municipal bankruptcies.
50. See id. §§ 1123, 1129 (setting forth detailed provisions for the restructuring of busi-
ness debt).
51. Id. § 1113.
52. 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Bildisco held that the decision by a chapter 11 debtor to
reject a collective bargaining agreement must be subject to the same standard applicable to
an executory contract under section 365 of the Code. Id. at 516. The Court also held that a
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LTV Corporation, upon filing bankruptcy, terminated the health and
life insurance benefits of 78,000 retirees.54 Finally, Congress added
section 52 4 (g) 55 in 1994 as a means to deal with future personal injury
claims against business debtors arising from exposure to asbestos-con-
taining products. 56
For individual debtors, the Code reflects contemporary consumer
spending and a debtor-friendly political ideology. The Code allows a
choice between chapter 7 "liquidation" and chapter 13 "reorganiza-
tion." Under chapter 7, the debtor turns over all non-exempt assets to
the bankruptcy trustee. 57 The trustee then sells the assets to pay credi-
tors, 58 and the debtor is discharged from all its unsecured debt.
59
State or federal exemptions, however, may allow a debtor to retain
much or all of his or her personal property.60 If the debtor is current
on his or her obligations for secured debt (such as a mortgage or car
payments), the debtor can keep the asset 61 and continue payments. 62
Some debts cannot be discharged. This includes most taxes, 6 3 spousal
or child support obligations, 64 and debt incurred by fraud.6 5 State or
federal exemptions may allow a debtor to keep most or all of his or
her property. 66 Under chapter 13, however, the debtor pays back a
portion of his or her debt over time (up to five years) through a plan
of reorganization 67 and may "cure" arrearages on secured debt during
the plan. 68
bargaining unit could not enforce the provisions of a bargaining agreement pending the
debtor's decision to assume or reject the agreement. Id. at 515.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1114.
54. Id. (Legislative History and Comment); see also NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACrICE 1231 (2d ed. 2006).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 52 4 (g).
56. Id. (Legislative History and Comment); see also NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 54, at 724-25. Section 52 4 (g) is notable in that it gives authority to
the court to issue a "channel injunction" binding all future claims against the estate. 11
U.S.C. § 52 4 (g).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 704. Section 522 specifies which assets of the debtor are exempt from
turnover to the trustee. Id. § 522.
58. Id. § 726.
59. Id. § 727.
60. Id. § 522.
61. Id. § 521 (a) (2) (A).
62. Id. § 522(c)(1).
63. Id. § 523(a)(1).
64. Id. § 523(a) (5).
65. Id. § 523(a) (4).
66. Id. § 522.
67. Id. § 1322.
68. Id. § 1325(a) (5).
In 2004, Congress enacted the latest change to bankruptcy law,
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 69
("BAPCPA"). BAPCPA tightened restrictions for individual debtors fil-
ing chapter 7 bankruptcy, inter alia, by requiring debtors with income
above certain statutory amounts to pay back at least a portion of their
debt.7 0
C. Bankruptcy and the Supremacy Clause
1. The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause 7 1 is a defining attribute of United States
federalism. It makes federal law superior to state laws that deal with
the same subject matter. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding. 72
The effect of the Supremacy Clause is that in areas where Con-
gress intends to legislate, federal law preempts state law. 73 As stated by
ChiefJustice Marshall, "acts of the State Legislatures... [which] inter-
fere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance
of the constitution," are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.7 4 More
simply, state law that conflicts with federal law is "without effect. '75
69. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2). See A Year After BAPCPA: How the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act Has Impacted Practitioners, Lenders, Consumers,
Turnaround Managers and Trustees (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/One
YearProgramTranscript.pdf, for an extensive analysis of BAPCPA.
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
72. Id.
73. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819).
74. Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
75. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). Federal law preemption can be
express or implied. The question is whether, in passing the law, Congress intends to "oc-
cup[y] the field." Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956). In Pennsylvania v. Nel-
son, the Supreme Court employed a three-part test to determine whether a federal law
would preempt a state law. The first element of the test is whether "' [t]he scheme of fed-
eral regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it.'" Id. at 502 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The second element is whether the statute "'touch[es] a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."' Id. at 504 (citing Rice, 331 U.S at
230). The third element is whether the enforcement of a state statute "presents a serious
danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program." Id. at 505.
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This includes state law dealing with insolvency, debtors, and the rights
of creditors.
In the absence of a national bankruptcy law, states were free to
enact their own insolvency laws. The exercise of national bankruptcy
power, not the mere existence of it, gives Congress exclusive right to
legislate bankruptcy law. 76 In between the enactment and repeal of
the several national bankruptcy laws, state bankruptcy laws were not
repealed, but suspended. Upon repeal of the national bankruptcy law,
state bankruptcy laws were again valid without further re-enactment. 77
The supremacy of federal bankruptcy law is embodied in the
landmark case, International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus.7s In that case, a trade
vendor, International Shoe, obtained a judgment in the amount of
$463.43 in an Arkansas county court against Pinkus, an insolvent
merchant.79 Pinkus had some forty-six creditors and owed over
$10,000, but his assets were less than $3,000.80 Pinkus commenced a
chancery action under the Arkansas insolvency law to declare himself
an insolvent."' Arkansas statutes provided a much greater personal
property exemption than the Act of 1898, which meant that Pinkus
would keep more of his assets if his case was adjudicated under state
law.8 2 Moreover, Pinkus had been discharged in voluntary bankruptcy
proceedings less than six years prior.8 3 If the Act of 1898 applied, he
could not have received another discharge before the expiration of six
years, so the debt owed to International Shoe and other creditors
would not be discharged. 4
International Shoe filed suit in federal court, arguing that the Act
of 1898 superseded the Arkansas bankruptcy law, and thus the chan-
cery action was a nullity.8 5 The Supreme Court found that the Arkan-
sas bankruptcy law "operates within the field occupied by the ... Act
[of 1898] .'86 Therefore, the Court was compelled to strike down the
Arkansas law.
76. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 368 (1827); Sturges v. Crownin-
shield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 199 (1819).
77. Butler v. Goreley, 146 U.S. 303, 314 (1892).
78. 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
79. Id. at 262.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 264.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 264-65.
85. Id. at 263.
86. Id. at 264.
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The power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States is unrestricted and par-
amount. The purpose to exclude state action for the discharge of
insolvent debtors may be manifested without specific declaration to
that end .... In respect of bankruptcies the intention of Congress
is plain. The national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily
excludes state regulation .... States may not pass or enforce laws
to interfere with or complement the... Act [of 1898] or to provide
additional or auxiliary regulations.
8 7
Thus, according to the Supremacy Clause, 88 federal bankruptcy
law must preempt state law where the effect of state law is to impede
the full operation and purpose of federal bankruptcy law.
2. Bankruptcy Code Section 106
Section 106 of the Code8 9 attempts to put state and non-state par-
ties on parity by eliminating the defense of sovereign immunity for
states and state agencies in bankruptcy. 90
Section 106(a) eliminates state immunity as a defense to suit or
process in bankruptcy, including proceedings to enforce the auto-
matic stay,9 ' treatment of leases and contracts, 92 proofs of claim, 93 ef-
87. Id. at 265 (internal citations omitted).
88. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
90. Section 106 states:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is
abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with
respect to the following:
Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 503, 505, 506,
510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551,552, 553,
722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944, 1107, 1141, 1142,
1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303, 1305, and 1327 of this
title.
The court may hear and determine an issue arising with respect to the application
of such sections to governmental units.
The court may issue against a governmental unit an order, process, or judgment
under such sections... including an order orjudgment awarding a money recov-
ery, but not including an award of punitive damages ....
Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of
action not otherwise existing under this tide, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, or nonbankruptcy law ....
Id. Section 106 was revised in 1994 after the Supreme Court ruled in Hoffman v. Conn.
Department of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989), and United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
503 U.S. 30 (1992), that section 106 was not "unmistakably clear" in abrogating state immu-
nity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
92. Id. § 365.
93. Id. § 502.
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fect of discharge, 94 discharge,95 turnover of property of the estate,96
and the trustee's lien avoidance powers, 97 such as avoidance of a pref-
erential transfer.98 Section 106(b) provides that if the government
files a proof of claim, it waives sovereignty with respect to any claims
arising out of the same occurrence from which the claim arose. 99 Pur-
suant to section 106(c), the debtor may assert a set-off to a claim or
interest asserted by a governmental unit in bankruptcy. 100 Together,
the provisions of section 106 clearly express Congress's intent to abro-
gate state immunity with respect to bankruptcy jurisdiction.
3. State Laws Incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code
The Code is highly amenable to state authority. Bankruptcy law is
not, of itself, a source of property rights. Instead, it functions to re-
adjust property rights that existed at the time that a bankruptcy was
filed. 101 Thus, bankruptcy law looks to nonbankruptcy law to deter-
mine the existence of property of the estate. 10 2
The Code frequently mandates the application of "nonban-
kruptcy law." For example, as provided in section 552,103 the proceeds
of property subject to a pre-petition security agreement are subject to
the security agreement post-petition "to the extent provided by ...
applicable nonbankruptcy law."'1 4 Section 541(c) (2) mandates that a
restriction on transfers of beneficial estates "that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this ti-
tle," even if the result is to reduce the amount of assets available to
creditors. 0 5 Under section 365(c), state law will determine if a breach
of contract occurred pre-petition, which may remove the contract as
property of the estate and terminate a debtor's rights in the con-
tract.1 0 6 As provided in section 523(a)(5) and section 523(a)(15),
state law will determine whether a divorce obligation is considered
94. Id. § 524.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 542.
97. Id. § 545.
98. Id. § 547.
99. Id. § 106(b).
100. Id. § 106(c).
101. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).
102. Zaylor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. (In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc.), 468 F.3d 248,
255 (5th Cir. 2006).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 552.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 541 (c) (2).
106. Id. § 365(c).
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support or distribution of property, which can be critical in whether
the obligation can be discharged in bankruptcy. 10 7 Although defer-
ence to individual state law often results in different outcomes to debt-
ors under similar facts, the Code tolerates these differences where
"nonbankruptcy law" applies. 10 8
Even if the Code does not expressly reference "nonbankruptcy
law" in a specific instance, bankruptcy courts almost always look to
state law on any substantive legal issue.' 0 9 Thus, a corporation that has
been dissolved under state law may not resurrect itself by filing a peti-
tion in bankruptcy court, even though bankruptcy law does not pro-
hibit this.'10
The Code provides significant accommodation to the states by au-
thorizing them to opt out of the federal exemption scheme.' The
Code allows debtors to choose the federal exemptions set forth in sec-
tion 522(d), 12 or the exemptions provided by the laws of the state in
which they live." 3 The Code, however, provides that states may opt
107. Id. §§ 523 (a) (5), 523 (a) (15).
108. See Daniel A. Austin, For Debtor or Worse: Discharge of Marital Debt Obligations Under
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 1369
(2005), for a discussion of differences among bankruptcy jurisdictions in how the dis-
charge of domestic support obligations is treated.
109. See, e.g., Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902). See Paul R.
Glassman, Choice of Law State Law in Bankruptcy Cases, 24 A.B.I.J. 32 (2005), for a compre-
hensive discussion of choice of state law in bankruptcy.
110. Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 129-30 (1937).
111. Exemptions are governed by section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522. Exemptions allow individual debtors to retain the unencumbered value of property
they own, up to certain federal- or state-law maximum amounts. Id.
112. Section 522(d) exemptions include up to $20,200 in the debtor's residence (the
"homestead exemption"), up to $3225 in one motor vehicle, $10,775 in household goods,
$1350 in jewelry, plus a $1075 "wildcard" exemption and up to $10,125 in unused home-
stead exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). Some assets, such as social security benefits, alimony
payments, and ERISA-qualified retirement assets are completely exempt from property of
the estate. § 522(d) (10).
113. State exemption laws are intended to shield certain assets of a judgment debtor
from seizure to pay judgments or creditors. The state exemptions vary widely. Florida's
famous "homestead exemption" provides that the unencumbered value of a house is com-
pletely shielded from judgment creditors, whereas Florida's personal property exemption
is only $1000 per person. FA. CoNsT. art. X, § 4. Pension assets and insurance proceeds
are shielded from creditors. FLA. STAT. § 222.21 (2007). Pennsylvania exemptions, in com-
parison, are not generous to debtors. Pennsylvania has no homestead exemption, but
property held jointly by spouses is exempt from creditors of an individual spouse. See Pat-
wardhan v. Brabant, 439 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Other Pennsylvania exemptions
include bibles, clothing, municipal pensions, and private pensions up to $15,000 per year.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8124 (2007). California has opted out of the federal scheme, but
allows debtors to choose from two sets of exemptions. The first set, including California
Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.010 and 704.730, allows a minimum homestead ex-
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out of the federal scheme, thus limiting the debtor to state law exemp-
tions.1 14 Two-thirds of states have opted out and permit only state
exemptions.'a
5
A tort of recent vintage suggests the further intersection between
bankruptcy law and state law. "Deepening insolvency" is a tort
whereby corporate officers, directors, and auditors can be subject to
liability for artificially attempting to prolong the life of an already in-
solvent company. "The premise underlying the deepening insolvency
theory is that even an insolvent company has value, which could be
salvaged if the company is liquidated or restructured in a timely man-
ner."116 To establish the cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that
while the company was in the "zone of insolvency," actions by the di-
rectors and officers to continue the enterprise breached a fiduciary
duty to creditors and the debtor itself."17 Whether liability exists
under a given set of facts depends upon state laws governing fiduciary
duty. Some states do not even recognize the tort.' 18
emption of $50,000, but somewhat less generous exemptions in certain personal property.
See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 704.010, 704.730 (West 2007). The second set, California Code
of Civil Procedure section 703.140, mostly mirrors the federal scheme under Bankruptcy
Code section 522(d), but is slightly more generous. See id. § 703.140.
114. 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(2).
115. States allowing debtors to choose either federal or state exemptions include Ar-
kansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
116. Kyung S. Lee et al., Deepening Insolvency - An Emerging Remedy Against Con-
temporary Corporate Malfeasance, Univ. of Tex. 23d Annual Bankr. Conf. (Nov. 18-19,
2004) (on file with author).
117. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 347
(3d Cir. 2001) (defining the tort of deepening insolvency as "fraudulent expansion of cor-
porate debt and prolongation of corporate life"); cf Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs.,
P.C. (In re CitX Corp., Inc.), 448 F.3d 672, 680 (3d Cir. 2006) (suggesting at note 11 that
the Third Circuit en banc should reconsider the case).
118. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re
VarTec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 634-35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (accusing VarTec's
lender of (1) making improper loans to the debtor; and (2) fraudulently arranging for the
debtor to pay down those loans shortly before VarTec filed for bankruptcy). The bank-
ruptcy court dismissed the case on motion of the lender under Federal Bankruptcy Rule
7012(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, since it determined
that Texas courts would not recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of
action. Id. at 646; see also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007) (holding that no duties owed to creditors by directors and officers
while the corporation was in the "zone of insolvency").
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4. State Laws in Conflict with the Bankruptcy Code
While the Code clearly preempts state insolvency laws, the Code
may also preempt a state nonbankruptcy law if it interferes with the
purposes of federal bankruptcy law.
An analysis of whether a federal statute preempts state law starts
"with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."' 19 Justice Hugo Black in Hines v.
Davidowitz,t20 stated:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of
treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of
the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the
field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; viola-
tion; curtailment; and interference .... In the final analysis ...
[o] ur primary function is to determine whether, under the circum-
stances of this particular case, [a challenged state statute] stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress. 12 1
In the past, courts made preemption determinations by looking
at the purpose of the state law in question, irrespective of its effects. In
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 122 a Utah statute intended to pro-
mote automobile financial responsibility included a provision making
judgments arising from automobile accidents non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 123 A chapter 7 debtor challenged the law on the grounds
that it frustrated the Act of 1898's purpose of giving a debtor a finan-
cial fresh start. 12 4 The Supreme Court upheld the Utah law because
the purpose of the law was not "to aid collection of debts but to en-
force a policy against irresponsible driving."' 2 5 The Court reached this
decision while admitting that the law left "the bankrupt to some ex-
tent burdened by the discharged debt" and in so doing, made "some
inroad . . .on the consequences of bankruptcy."' 2 6
119. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
120. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
121. Id. at 67. This test is has been adopted for analysis of state law under the
Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964);
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141, 165 (1963); Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945).
122. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
123. Id. at 155.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 169.
126. Id. at 171. The Court conceded that the law made "it more probable that the debt
will be paid despite the discharge." Id. at 173; see also Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 37
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Almost a decade after Kesler, the Court in Perez v. Campbell12 7
abandoned the "purpose" test in favor of an "effects" test. 1 28 In 1956,
the Arizona legislature adopted the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act 1 29 ("Arizona Act"). The Arizona Act required all mo-
tor vehicles registered in Arizona to be covered by a specified
minimum level of liability coverage and provided that the license of a
driver involved in an accident would be suspended if a judgment debt
arising from the accident remained unpaid by the driver for more
than sixty days after entry of such judgment.13 0 The law also included
a provision mandating that "a discharge in bankruptcy following the
rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judgment debtor
from any of the requirements of this article.' 3 ' After the plaintiffs
were involved in an auto accident, the other driver sued the plaintiffs
and won a judgment of nearly $2500.132 The plaintiffs filed a chapter
7 bankruptcy petition and listed the judgment as a dischargeable
debt. 3 3 The debt was discharged, but Arizona suspended the plain-
tiffs' licenses and automobile registration in accordance with the Ari-
zona Act. 134 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a state,
in enacting legislation to accomplish a legitimate public policy objec-
tive, could suspend the effect of a discharge under the Code as a
means to achieve that objective.1 3 5
The Court held that deciding whether a state statute is in conflict
with a federal one is "essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining
the construction of the two statutes and then determining the consti-
(1941), in which a similar law in New York survived challenge from a debtor, despite the
fact that the effect of the law frustrated the policy of the Act of 1898:
The penalty which [the New York law] imposes for injury due to careless driving
is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy that
irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows
.... [T] he legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not inter-
fere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in derogation of the
Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching
highway safety.
Id.
127. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
128. Id. at 652.
129. APlz. Rsv. STAT. ANN. 28-1163 (1956). This act was based on the Uniform Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act promulgated by the National Conference on Street and
Highway Safety.
130. Perez, 402 U.S. at 639-40.
131. Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. 28-1163(B).
132. Perez, 402 U.S. at 638.
133. Id. at 639.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 643.
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tutional question of whether they are in conflict."'136 The Arizona Act
provided leverage for the collection of damages from drivers who ad-
mit negligence or are adjudicated negligent.137 The primary purpose
of federal bankruptcy law is to "give debtors 'a new opportunity in life,
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt."'
1 3 8
The Court expressly rejected the purpose test of Kesler, reasoning
that such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all
unwanted federal legislation by simply "publishing a legislative com-
mittee report articulating some state interest or policy-other than
frustration of the federal objective.' 39 The Court invalided the Ari-
zona Act, finding that "any state legislation which frustrates the full
effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy
Clause." 140
Since Perez, federal courts have held that state laws may not inter-
fere with the full effect of bankruptcy discharge for public policy pur-
poses.' 41 For example, a state court was barred from proceeding with
a foreclosure of a farm where the farmer had filed for bankruptcy and
requested an extension of time in the bankruptcy court. 142 Federal
bankruptcy law also discharged a debtor from a state court order di-
recting the debtor to remediate a waste disposal site. 143 In Agnew v.
Franchise Tax Board of California (In re Sharon Steel Corporation) ,144 a
major chapter 11 case, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to deter-
mine the identity of the component members of a group for Califor-
nia franchise-tax purposes because section 106 provided for limited
abrogation of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases. 145 More re-
136. Id. at 644.
137. Id. at 646-47. The Court concluded that the purpose of the law was not one of
deterrence. The Court noted that the victim of the tortfeasor's negligence could volunta-
rily waive the payment requirement, that there was no provision keeping careless drivers
off the road, and that if both drivers were found negligent, then there was no liability for
damages arising from the accident. Id. at 647-48.
138. Id. at 648 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
139. Id. at 652.
140. Id.
141. The New York State Attorney General later concluded that a motor vehicle law
providing that a civil penalty is not dischargeable in bankruptcy is unconstitutional and
superseded by the Bankruptcy Code. See N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 98-FIO (1998), available at
www.oag.state.ny.us/lawyers/opinions/1998/formal/98_fflO.html.
142. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1939).
143. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1984).
144. 118 B.R. 30 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
145. Id.
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cently, in Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,1 4 6 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that section 544(b) of the Code, which allows a
trustee to avoid a preferential transfer, preempts California's Assign-
ment for the Benefit of Creditors.1 4 7 States, of course, are bound by
bankruptcy court discharge orders in the same way as any other credi-
tor, and by other standard bankruptcy court rulings.
1 48
5. Uniformity Theory of Bankruptcy Law
Central to the discussion of federalism and state sovereignty is the
argument of uniformity-that the Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Con-
gress to make "uniform laws" on the subject of bankruptcy, and that
bankruptcy laws must be "uniform" and apply to states as equally as to
all other creditors, in order to effectuate the purposes of bankruptcy.
This argument is based upon Article I of the Constitution, which pro-
vides that Congress shall have the power to "establish a uniform Rule
of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States. ' 149 The use of the word "uniform" is
key. In Federalist Number 32, Hamilton described how state sover-
eignty is abrogated where the Constitution "granted an authority to
the Union, to which a similar authority granted to the States would be
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant. '" 150 According to
Hamilton, one example of this is the uniform powers of naturaliza-
tion.1 51 Thus, it can be concluded that by using the identical word,
"uniform," in connection with the Bankruptcy Clause and in immedi-
ate proximity to the naturalization clause, the Framers intended that
the congressional power of bankruptcy would also abrogate state im-
munity, as it did with the naturalization power.1 52 The uniformity the-
ory is not concerned with whether Article I per se abrogates state
146. 394 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2005).
147. Id. at 1204.
148. Davie v. Rudgers (In reDavie), 302 B.R. 432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003); see New York
v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 333 (1932) (holding that New York proof of claim for
taxes is barred as untimely); Van Huffle v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1931) (hold-
ing that the bankruptcy court has authority to sell debtor's property free and clear of state
tax lien); In re Bluewater Palmas, Ltd., No. 02-07967, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3813 (Bankr.
D.P.R. May 1, 2006) (holding that a debtor's estate is entitled to payment of interest on
fees properly payable by the state to the estate).
149. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
151. Id. The most complete articulation of this theory is in J. Haines, The Uniformity
Power: Why Bankruptcy is Different, 77 Am. BANKR. L.J. 129 (2003).
152. This was the conclusion of the Sixth Circuit in Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance
Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755, 766 (6th Cir. 2003), afj'd on other grounds, 541 U.S. 440
(2004).
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immunity. The use of the word "uniform" sets bankruptcy apart from
the other Article I clauses. 15 3
Moreover, uniformity does not mean just geographically uniform
laws. It also means that bankruptcy law should be administered uni-
formly. Treating states as different from other creditors would frus-
trate this purpose. 154 The uniformity theory is compelling because it
offers the simplicity and consistency of treating state and non-state
parties alike.
II. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."155
The meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is straightforward:
states are immune from suit, even under federal law, absent their con-
sent or a valid abrogation of their immunity by Congress. 156 Con-
versely, the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to suits where the court
determines that Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state
153. SeeGrayv. Univ. of Alaska (In reDehon, Inc.), 327 B.R. 38, 54-56 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2005).
154. An example of this holding can be found in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v.
New York State Department (In re Operation Open Czty, Inc.), 148 B.R. 184, 185-86 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992), affrd, 170 B.R. 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994):
Bankruptcy is a collective process in which all parties share in an inevitably inade-
quate estate. The bankruptcy court is the forum in which all parties resolve dis-
putes regarding distribution of estate assets. This process, however, cannot
function properly if any significant participant remains immune from the system's
fundamental rules. This adversary proceeding involves a governmental unit which
has extracted funds from a debtor's estate without seeking prior court approval
and now claims that sovereign immunity precludes this Court from reviewing the
governmental unit's actions.
Id.; see also In re Dehon, 327 B.R. at 57-58. For a critique of the "uniformity theory," see
Cecily Fuhr, Sovereign Immunity: The "Uniform Laws" Theory Tries (And Fails) to Take a Bank-
ruptcy-sized Bite out of the Eleventh Amendment, 77 WASH. L. Rv. 511 (2002).
155. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
156. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that states are
immune from suit brought under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that states are immune from suit brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); College Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that states are immune from
suit brought under the Lanham Act); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding that the state is immune from suit brought under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act). Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to counties. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189 (2006).
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Eleventh Amendment immunity, and where Congress was authorized
to do SO. 1 5 7
A. Chisholm v. Georgia on My Mind
Although many consider the concept of state sovereign immunity
to be implicit in the American constitutional scheme, 5 8 the Eleventh
Amendment owes its existence to Chisholm v. Georgia.159 In 1792, Alex-
ander Chisholm, as executor of the estate of Robert Farquhar, sued
the State of Georgia in federal court to recover monies owed to Far-
quhar for materials supplied to Georgia during the Revolutionary
War. 160 With the war won, and the memory of marauding British
troops receding, Georgia reneged on its war debt and refused to ap-
pear in the case on the grounds that it was sovereign.' 6' The district
and appellate courts found in favor of Chisholm, and the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
per se abrogated state immunity and granted federal courts jurisdic-
tion to hear disputes between citizens and states. 162
The popular reaction to Chisholm was largely unfavorable, since it
subjected states with war debt to suit by creditors in federal court. Leg-
islation to enact the Eleventh Amendment was introduced the next
day in the United States House of Representatives, and the Massachu-
setts legislature formally declared the ruling "repugnant to the first
principles of a federal government."'163 The Georgia House of Repre-
sentatives went even further, decreeing that anyone attempting to en-
157. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (holding that Title II of Americans
with Disabilities Act abrogates state immunity); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 506 (2004)
(holding that Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act abrogates state sovereign immu-
nity); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that family care
provisions of Family Medical Leave Act abrogate state immunity).
158. Alexander Hamilton's statement in Federalist 81 is frequently cited: "It is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty not to be amendable to the suit of an individual without its
consent .... Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention, it will remain with the States .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 511 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521
U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997) (noting "the broader concept of immunity, implicit in the
Constitution").
159. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 423-24.
163. 15 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 314 (H. Syrett &J. Cooke eds., 1969).
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force the Chisholm decision would be guilty of a felony and suffer
death by hanging "without benefit of clergy." 164
B. The Eleventh Amendment in the Courts
A suit comes under Eleventh Amendment scrutiny when either
"the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury," or
"the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government
from acting, or compel it to act.'"165 The Eleventh Amendment insu-
lates states from "private parties seeking to impose a liability [in fed-
eral court] which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury."' 66
The scope of state sovereignty under federal statutes has been a
contentious issue in constitutional litigation, and there is currently no
consensus. The history of Eleventh Amendment litigation suggests
that the border between federalism and state sovereignty is far from
established.
1. Hans v. Louisiana
Contemporary Eleventh Amendment law begins with Hans v. Lou-
isiana.167 In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana owned bonds issued by the
State of Georgia. 168 The Georgia legislature proposed a change in the
state constitution that would have re-directed the interest on the
bonds to defray state expenses.' 69 Hans sued the State of Georgia, al-
leging that such a change in the state constitution would render his
bonds worthless, thereby impairing the obligations of a contract in
164. D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801
196 (1997).
165. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (internal citations omitted). Not all suits
seeking monetary relief from a state automatically offend the Eleventh Amendment. It is
well established that a suit that "serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of
federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though accompanied by a
substantial ancillary effect" of compelling a state to expend public funds. Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). However, "[r]elief that in essence serves to compensate a party
injured in the past... even though styled as something else," is barred under the Eleventh
Amendment. Id.
166. Hufford v. Rodgers, 912 F.2d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Edelman v.Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)) (internal quotations omitted). Strictly interpreted, the Eleventh
Amendment applies only to state and not local government. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001).
167. 134 U.S. 1 (1890); seeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
168. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
169. Id. at 3.
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violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.
1 70
The issue before the Supreme Court in Hans was that the Eleventh
Amendment forbids citizens of one state from suing another state, but
says nothing about citizens suing their own state.17 1 The Court made
little effort to establish a historical basis for state immunity, but simply
concluded that immunity of the national government and of states "is
called upon by the highest demands of natural and political law."'
7 2
2. Ex Parte Young
Ex parte Young' 73 somewhat pared back the sweeping rule of Hans
and in so doing, created a legal fiction that is still in use today. In
1907, Minnesota passed laws that restricted the tariffs that railroads
could charge for carrying freight within the state. 174 The laws imposed
heavy penalties for violations, including fines and jail.1 75 Railroads
strongly opposed the law, so a number of railroad company share-
holders filed suit in federal court against the Attorney General of Min-
nesota, Edward T. Young, to enjoin him from enforcing the law. 176
Young moved to dismiss, asserting that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the federal court from hearing the case. 17 7 The federal court
rejected Young's argument and issued the injunction against enforc-
ing the law. 178 The next day, Young filed in state court to enforce the
law. 179 The federal court held Young in contempt of court and com-
menced proceedings to imprison him.' 80 In response, Young filed a
writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court.' 8 '
The case exposed a tension between the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Eleventh Amendment. The railroads argued that the Minne-
sota law violated the Fourteenth Amendment by making freight rates
so low that it amounted to a taking in violation of the right to due
170. Id. at 2-3; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant
any Title of Nobility.").
171. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
172. Id. at 21.
173. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
174. Id. at 127.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 129.
177. Id. at 132.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 133.
process. 18 2 On the other hand, the Supreme Court had recently held
in Hans that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from hear-
ing suits by citizens against their own states.' 83
To resolve the dilemma, the Court reasoned that when a state
official does something that is unconstitutional, he or she must be
acting as an individual, since, under the Supremacy Clause, states are
forbidden to violate the Constitution.18 4 Accordingly, a state official
can act simultaneously in dual capacities: (1) as a non-state actor when
doing the unconstitutional act, because the Fourteenth Amendment
only prohibits unconstitutional state action; and (2) as an individual
when sued to enjoin the state action, because a state cannot be
sued.' 8 5 Thus, pursuant to Ex parte Young, sovereign immunity is not a
bar to actions seeking prospective injunctive relief against state offi-
cials to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.'
8 6
3. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.'8 7 was the next significant de-
velopment in the law of sovereign immunity. In 1994, Deep Sea Re-
search located a valuable shipwreck four miles off the California
coast.' 8 8 The company filed a declaratory judgment action in federal
court to adjudicate its rights to the wreck. 189 The State of California
entered a limited appearance to dismiss the complaint for lack of ju-
risdiction and claimed tide to the wreck under federal and California
statutes purporting to grant the state title to abandoned shipwrecks. 190
The district court rejected the claim of immunity and the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 19 1 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
182. Id. at 143-44.
183. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3 (1890).
184. ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908).
185. Id. at 159-60.
186. In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007). In order to determine
whether the Ex parte Young exception applies, a court must ask "whether [the] complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as pro-
spective." Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). The
exception does not apply if Congress has provided a remedial scheme so that equitable
remedy through the courts is not necessary. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
76 (1996). Additionally, the exception may not apply if certain state sovereign interests are
present, such as state ownership and control of land. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 287 (1997).
187. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
188. Id. at 496.
189. Id. at 495.
190. Id. at 496.
191. Deep Sea Research v. Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 387 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Eleventh Amendment barred adjudication of the rights to a res when
the res was not in the state's possession. 192
The Court unanimously ruled that the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar the federal district court from adjudicating California's rights
in a shipwreck. The Court noted that under the Constitution, Article
III, Section 2, clause 1, the judicial power of federal courts extends to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, but that the Eleventh
Amendment constrains the jurisdiction of federal courts. 193 There was
no conflict in this case, however, because the res was not in the state's
possession. 194 Owing to federal jurisdiction over admiralty, the federal
court has jurisdiction in in rem admiralty actions where the state is
not in possession of the disputed property.1 95 This case stands for the
rule that if the subject ofjurisdiction is enumerated within the powers
of Congress, federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the state's
interests in a res, even if the courts do not have authority to compel
the state to hand over the res.
4. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company
Two major battles in the struggle between federalism and state
sovereignty were fought just six years apart and on almost identical
ground. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 196 held that Congress had au-
thority to abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause.1 97
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida1 98 held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred Congress from abrogating state immunity under the Indian
Commerce Clause. 199 While Seminole Tribe was a slim five-to-four deci-
sion, there was no majority in Union Gas. The lack of a definitive con-
sensus in these cases underscores the volatile nature of federalism
versus state sovereignty.
Union Gas Co. dealt with whether Congress could properly subject
states to suit by private individuals under the provisions of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
192. California v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506-07.
193. Id. at 501.
194. Id. at 504.
195. Id. at 507.
196. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have Power "[t]o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes").
198. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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of 1980200 ("CERCLA"), enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. 20 A four-justice plurality, with Justice Stevens joining only in
the result, upheld the private right of action under CERCLA on the
grounds that "the States granted a portion of their sovereignty when
they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce."20 2 The
Court cited Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,203 which held that Congress may sub-
ject states to suits for money damages in federal court when legislating
under the Fourteenth Amendment.20 4 "Such enforcement [of the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment] is no invasion of State
sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States have, by the
Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to enact."20 5
On this reasoning, the Court concluded, "[e]ach of these points is as
applicable to the Commerce Clause as it is to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,"20 6 thus equating the Commerce Clause with the Fourteenth
Amendment, with both allowing for abrogation of state immunity.
The dissent castigated the plurality, asserting that the Eleventh
Amendment and Hans clearly forbade abrogation of state immunity
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.20 7
5. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
The case of Seminole Tribe directly contradicted the plurality opin-
ion in Union Gas Co. and, by its uncompromising approach, was clearly
intended by the majority to be the definitive interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1980), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613.
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
202. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 14 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't,
377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)). Other cases cited by the Court to the effect that states surren-
dered some of their sovereignty under the Commerce Clause include Welch v. Texas Depart-
ment of Highways & Publzc Transportatzon, 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987); County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985); Employees v. Missouri Department of Public
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973) ("the states surrendered a portion of their
sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce"). CERCLA in-
voked the Commerce Clause because environmental harm is "often not susceptible of a
local solution," as hazardous wastes and dumping and clean-up very often occur across
state lines. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 20-21.
203. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
204. Id. at 445-46.
205. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 16 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454
(1976)).
206. Id.
207. See zd. at 32, 35.
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Seminole Tribe concerned the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 20 8
("IGRA"), enacted by Congress under the Indian Commerce
Clause.20 9 The IGRA allows an Indian tribe to conduct gaming activi-
ties, but only in conformance with a valid pact between the tribe and
the state in which the gaming activities are located.210 The IGRA re-
quires states to negotiate in good faith with a tribe to formulate the
compact 211 and provides that a tribe may sue a state in federal court to
compel performance if the state refuses to negotiate.21 2 After Florida
allegedly refused to conduct negotiations for tribe-related gaming ac-
tivities, the Seminole Tribe filed suit against Florida. 213
The case hinged on two issues: first, whether Congress abrogated
state immunity through the IGRA, and second, whether Congress ac-
ted pursuant to a valid exercise of power.214 Since the language abro-
gating state immunity was clear, the Court focused on the
constitutional issue of whether Congress has power to abrogate state
immunity.
Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Rehnquist argued that
state immunity has its roots in the common law of England and in the
"fundamental 'jurisprudence of all civilized nations."' 21 5 The majority
found that congressional abrogation of immunity had been upheld in
only one case, Union Gas Co., which the Court characterized as a "soli-
tary departure from established law." 2 16 The Court held that Article I
does not give Congress power to abrogate state immunity, and as the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified after the Eleventh Amendment,
Congress may only abrogate state immunity to the extent necessary to
protect rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.217
In an extraordinarily lengthy dissent, Justice Souter was not per-
suaded that the Framers intended federal law to be subordinate to
state sovereign immunity. Rather, states would be part of a system, and
power would be divided between the states and the Nation, with "the
208. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1988).
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
210. 11 U.S.C. §2710(d)(1)(C).
211. Id. § 2710(d) (3) (A).
212. Id. § 2710(d) (7) (B).
213. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 45 (1996).
214. Id. at 57-58.
215. Id. at 69 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1889)).
216. Id. at 66.
217. Id. at 59. There was extensive criticism of the case among commentators. A mea-
sured critique of Seminole Tribe is found in Leonard G. Gershon, A Bankruptcy Exception to
Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Limiting the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 Am. BANKR. L.J. 2
(2000).
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[Nation] to be invested with its own judicial power and the right to
prevail against the States whenever their respective substantive laws
might be in conflict."218
Before Katz, most bankruptcy courts followed this rule from Semi-
nole Tribe.219 Several bankruptcy courts creatively endeavored to find
that the Code was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,220 but this was clearly a minority position.2 2 1
6. Alden v. Maine
A discussion on the Eleventh Amendment and bankruptcy juris-
diction would be incomplete without a review of Alden v. Maine.222
Coming on the heels of Seminole Tribe, and not long before Katz, the
case shows just how deeply entrenched the opposing camps had
become.
In Alden, a group of probation officers filed suit against their em-
ployer, the State of Maine, for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA"). After being dismissed on the grounds of sovereign
immunity from federal court, the officers then filed the same action in
state court, which likewise dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign
immunity. 223 The Maine Supreme Court upheld the lower court's de-
cision. 224 In a five-to-four ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed. 225
For the majority in Alden, state sovereign immunity is inherent in
the Constitution and does not arise from the Eleventh Amend-
ment.226 Well before the Constitution was drafted, the Framers as-
sumed that states naturally possessed "residual and inviolable
sovereignty." 227 Thus, the majority in Alden concluded,
218. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 104 (Souter, J., dissenting).
219. Techs. Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Kentucky (In re Technologies Int'l Holdings, Inc.),
Nos. 99-50867, 99-50868, 99-50869, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1541, at *30 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov.
24, 2003) (citing Seminole Tribe in ruling that bankruptcy debtor suit against Kentucky
barred by the Eleventh Amendment as only the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the
Bankruptcy Code, validly abrogated state immunity).
220. In re Willis, 230 B.R. 619 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999); In re Straight, 209 B.R. 540
(Bankr. D. Wyo. 1997); In re Headrick, 203 B.R. 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).
221. See Techs. Int'l Holdings, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1541, at *30, and cases cited therein.
222. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Whereas Seminole Tribe dealt with the authority of a federal
court to hear citizen suits against a state agency, Alden addressed whether a state court had
jurisdiction to hear citizen suits against state agencies. Id. at 711-12.
223. Id. at 711-12.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 712.
226. Id. at 713.
227. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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[T] he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is
limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the
Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpre-
tations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain
today.., except as altered by the plan of the Constitution or cer-
tain constitutional Amendments. 228
The minority in Alden, however, could find no evidence that state
immunity was immutable to the Framers. The dearth of notes or de-
bate on the issue among the Framers, 229 and the fact that two of the
four-justice plurality in Chisholm were participants in the Constitu-
tional Convention (as was Chisholm's attorney, Edmund Ran-
dolph),230 led the dissent to conclude that state sovereign immunity
was anything but sacrosanct. Pre-Constitution, some states did not
even consider themselves to be immune from suit, while other states
were ambivalent.2 31 Moreover, there was at least some popular senti-
ment at the time that no sovereign should be immune from suit by
citizens. 232 The dissent concluded that sovereign immunity was con-
sidered by the Framers to be, at most, a right under common law, not
natural law.2 33 Such a right was not properly amenable to contempo-
rary circumstances, which were unlike anything that existed at the
time of the Framers. 234
7. Ex Parte Young Meets Bankruptcy: In re Dairy Mart
In re Dairy Mart23 5 extended Ex parte Young's sovereign immunity
exception. Dairy Mart operated a chain of convenience stores, some
of which sold gasoline. 23 6 The gasoline was stored under the gas
pumps in underground tanks, which were subject to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act 237 ("RCRA"). The State of Kentucky
administered a fund to assist owners of underground tanks to comply
228. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
229. Id. at 772-73.
230. Id. at 789.
231. Id. at 769-70, 772.
232. Id. at 784-85.
233. Id. at 774-78.
234. Id. at 807.
235. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Nickel (In re Dairy Mart), 411 F.3d 367 (2d
Cir. 2005).
236. Id. at 369.
237. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
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with RCRA cleanup requirements, but the fund program had a strict
claim application deadline of October 12, 2001.238
Dairy Mart filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization on
September 24, 2001 in the Southern District of New York.2 3 9 Twenty-
two of its Kentucky stores were eligible for assistance under the fund,
but Dairy Mart missed the claim deadline by four days, and its claims
were denied.2 40 Dairy Mart asserted that its claims should be approved
because section 108(b) of the Code automatically extends any
nonbankruptcy claim filing deadline for an additional sixty days from
the initial bankruptcy filing date.24 1 That would have given Dairy Mart
until November 24, 2001 to file its claims.
Dairy Mart brought an adversary proceeding to compel payment
of the claims.242 Kentucky state officials filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of sovereign immunity, arguing that the remedy sought
by Dairy Mart went beyond the Ex parte Young rule of allowing suits to
enjoin unconstitutional conduct. The state officials argued that the
effect of allowing the bankruptcy court to rule on the injunction
would be to require the State of Kentucky to pay money to plaintiffs
from the state treasury. 243 Thus, the action was directed, not just to-
wards state officials, but the State of Kentucky itself. The bankruptcy
court denied the motion on the grounds that the suit sought injunc-
tive relief to enjoin violation of federal law, thereby falling within the
Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immu-
nity.2 4 4 The district court affirmed. 245
The Second Circuit found that the Eleventh Amendment was not
absolute. "In tension with the immunity of the states is the supremacy
of the Union and its Constitution. '2 4 6 The Second Circuit noted that
payment of state funds, an "ancillary effect" of proper injunctive relief,
238. Dairy Mart, 411 F.3d at 370.
239. Id. at 368.
240. Id. at 370.
241. Section 108(b) provides as follows:
[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law.., fixes a period within which the debtor...
may file any pleading, demand, notice, or proof of claim or loss . . .and such
period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee
may ... file, cure, or perform, as the case may be ... 60 days after the order for
relief.
11 U.S.C. § 108(b) 2000.
242. Darry Mart, 411 F.3d at 370.
243. Id. at 375.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 371.
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was "a permissible and often an inevitable consequence" of the Ex
parte Young doctrine.247 In this case, eligibility for the state funds was
entirely within the purview of state law-ordering injunctive relief that
the claim be accepted was not an order that the State of Kentucky pay
money. 248 It could still refuse to pay the claims, if allowed under state
law.2 49 The Second Circuit concluded that "the Supremacy Clause de-
mands that any rights of Dairy Mart under the bankruptcy code must
be equitably met, and the payment is simply an ancillary effect of a
properly issued injunction. '250
The court in Dairy Mart did not actually abrogate state immu-
nity-Kentucky had already provided for payment of the funds to eli-
gible citizens. Rather, the court invoked its bankruptcy powers against
Kentucky to restore the debtor's eligibility for the funds. This is con-
ceptually different from a case in which a bankruptcy court orders a
state to restore a preferential payment. In the latter situation, the
debtor's interest only exists because of the Code. The result, however,
is the same: state money is paid to a citizen as a consequence of the
exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction. It is almost certain that the Semi-
nole Tribe majority would not have approved of this outcome if they
had reviewed the case.
III. Conflict at the Border: Central Virginia Community College
v. Katz
A. Bankruptcy Opinions Leading up to Katz
The road leading to Katz is a study in judicial progression and
shifting court majorities. It mirrors the judicial gyrations of the Elev-
enth Amendment.
1. Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance
The Court's decision in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of In-
come Maintenance2 51 shows the Court's tentative approach to state abro-
gation of immunity. In Hoffman, a chapter 7 trustee in a bankruptcy
case filed two unrelated adversarial proceedings against the State of
Connecticut.252 One proceeding, filed pursuant to section 542(b) of
247. Id. at 375 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)).
248. Id. at 375-76.
249. See id. at 376.
250. Id.
251. 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
252. Id. at 99.
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the Code, 253 demanded "turnover" of Medicare payments made for
services performed by a bankrupt nursing home.254 The other action
was brought pursuant to section 547 of the Code to recover a "prefer-
ential" transfer of funds paid for state taxes, interest, and penalties
within ninety days before the bankruptcy filing.255 Connecticut filed a
motion to dismiss both complaints on the grounds of sovereign
immunity.256
The bankruptcy court ruled that by enacting section 106(c) of
the Code, Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
litigation for turnover and preference actions. 257 The district court re-
versed,258 and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that section
106(c) abrogates state immunity to the extent necessary to determine
a state's right in property of the estate, but not to the extent of recov-
ering a money judgment or other property from a state. 259 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the lower court decision, but without deciding
the constitutional validity of section 106.260 Instead, after minutely ex-
plicating the language of section 106(a) and (b), the Court concluded
that it was "unlikely" that Congress intended "broad abrogation" of
the Eleventh Amendment.261 Rather, section 106(c) was "more indica-
tive of declaratory and injunctive relief than of monetary recovery." 262
In cases involving possible abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment,
Congress's intent to do so must be "unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute." 263
Such was the five-to-four majority opinion. However, in their con-
curring opinions, both Justices Scalia and O'Connor flatly asserted
that Congress had no power under the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.264 Justice Scalia would
have affirmed the Second Circuit decision "without the necessity of
considering whether Congress intended to exercise a power it did not
253. 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2000).
254. Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 99.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint. v. Hoffman (In reWillington Convalescent Home),
72 B.R. 1002 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1988), afJd 492 U.S. 96
(1989).
259. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint. (In reWillington Convalescent Home),
850 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1988), affd 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
260. Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 104.
261. Id. at 101.
262. Id. at 102.
263. Id. at 101 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
264. Id at 105 (O'Connor, J. & Scalia, J., concurring).
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possess."2 65 In contrast, Justice Stevens wrote in his dissenting opin-
ion that the legislative history showed that the drafters of the Code
were "well aware of the value to the bankruptcy administration process
of a waiver of federal and state sovereign immunity. 2
6 6
Congress responded to this decision, 26 7 by strengthening the lan-
guage of section 106(c) to more clearly express the intent to abrogate
state sovereignty in bankruptcy litigation.268
2. Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood
The case of Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,2 69 a seven-to-
two decision, was a critical stepping-stone to Katz, although decided
upon far narrower grounds. In Hood, a bankruptcy debtor owed stu-
dent loans to a Tennessee state student loan agency.270 Ordinarily,
government-guaranteed student loans are not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy unless the debtor can demonstrate that the debtor and any de-
pendents would suffer "undue hardship" if required to repay the
loans. 27 1 The debtor filed a complaint against the state agency seeking
a hardship discharge, and the agency moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. 2 72 The bankruptcy court denied the motion,
holding that, pursuant to section 106(a) of the Code, the Bankruptcy
Clause gave Congress the power to abrogate state sovereignty.27 3 The
district courts and Sixth Circuit affirmed. 274
The Supreme Court also affirmed, but on different grounds.2 75
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that the dis-
265. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
266. Id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. This was also a response to a similar decision in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
503 U.S. 30 (1992).
268. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (2000).
269. 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
270. Id. at 444.
271. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8). This is a difficult showing to make. Many courts have
adopted the three-prong test used in Brunner v. New York Higher Education Services Corp., 831
F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987): present dire financial circumstances, likelihood of condition con-
tinuing in the future, and the debtor's good faith attempt to repay the loan. See id. at 396.
272. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 444-45. Federal bankruptcy procedures require the debtor
seeking a student loan discharge to file a complaint and serve the complaint with a sum-
mons upon a representative of the lender. FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7001(6), 7003, 7004.
273. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 445.
274. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir.
2003).
275. Later, several bankruptcy courts continued to cite the Sixth Circuit opinion in
Hood in holding that section 106 validly abrogated state immunity. See, e.g., Quality Stores,
Inc. v. Vt. Dep't of Taxes (In re Quality Stores, Inc.), 324 B.R. 631, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Mich.
2005) (holding that adversary proceeding for turnover of funds held by Vermont Depart-
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charge of a debt by a bankruptcy court is an in rem proceeding, and
that a bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor's prop-
erty, wherever located. 276 Because the court's jurisdiction is premised
upon the res, a nonparticipating creditor cannot be subjected to per-
sonal liability. 277 Thus, a debtor is not seeking money damages or
other affirmative relief by filing a complaint for discharge of a student
debt-he seeks only the discharge of the debt.278 The fact that Federal
Bankruptcy Rules 2 79 require a bankruptcy court to issue process was
not an "indignity to the sovereignty of a State" because it was only a
procedural modus to bring the issue before the bankruptcy court.280
For the dissent, even an adjudication of discharge of a state debt vio-
lated the Eleventh Amendment, because "the State is compelled to
either subject itself to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction or to forfeit
its rights."28 1
Numerous bankruptcy courts followed the ruling in Hood.28 2 In
Flores v. Illinois Department of Public Health,283 a chapter 7 debtor filed
an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeablity of a scholar-
ship obligation owed to Vermont. 28 4 Vermont filed a motion to dis-
miss based on sovereign immunity.28 5 The bankruptcy court denied
the motion, pursuant to Hood, and suggested that the Supreme Court
in Seminole Tribe "painted its picture of sovereign immunity.., with an
overly broad brush." 28 6
In Florida Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Maheffey (In re Florida Furniture
Industries, Inc.), 287 the court denied the motion of a taxing authority
to dismiss a complaint for determination of a tax liability.288 Citing
ment of Revenue could proceed since section 106(a) was a valid abrogation of state
immunity).
276. Hood, 541 U.S. at 448.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 450.
279. FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7001(b), 7003.
280. Hood, 541 U.S. at 452.
281. Id. at 458 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
282. See, e.g., Texas v. Davis (In re Davis), 340 B.R. 767, 771 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006)
(holding that discharge of debt owed to state by bail bond operator not in violation of the
Eleventh Amendment); Gray v. Fla. State Univ. (In re Dehon), 327 B.R. 38, 58 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2006) ("[T]he Framers intended that the Constitution would alienate state's sover-
eign immunity with regard to bankruptcy matters upon ratification.").
283. 300 B.R. 599 (Bankr. Vt. 2003).
284. Id. at 600.
285. Id. at 601.
286. Id. at 602.
287. 342 B.R. 838 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
288. Id. at 841.
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Hood, the court ruled that since the res at issue in the case-a tax
liability-is not in possession of the state, the court's action would not
require in personam jurisdiction against the state. 289
The bankruptcy court in Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corp.
v. Crow (In re Crow)290 drew a distinction between adjudicating rights
to a res in the debtor's possession, and ordering affirmative relief for
money damages against a state. In In re Crow, the court rejected a mo-
tion by a state agency to dismiss the debtor's student discharge com-
plaint, but dismissed the debtor's count for wrongful damages for
collection efforts instead.29 1 "Because count two seeks affirmative re-
lief from the state through a coercive judicial process, the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over it is premised on the persona of the state, not
on the res of the debtor's property. Because jurisdiction is in personam,
Eleventh Amendment concerns are not obviated by Hood."
292
3. Official Committee v. Public Utilities Commission (In re 360networks
(USA), Inc.)
In Official Committee v. Public Utilities Commission (In re 360networks
(USA), Inc.),293 the court considered whether the New York Public
Utilities Commission ("NYPUC") was subject to a lawsuit for the re-
turn of a preferential transfer under the preference avoidance provi-
sions of section 547.294 The bankruptcy court, citing Hood, ruled that
its in rem jurisdiction allowed it to "determine all claims that any-
one .. .has to the property or thing in question" and that an in rem
proceeding is "one against the world ... to establish an unquestiona-
ble title to the res."295 The court did not exercise in personamjurisdic-
tion against New York or its agencies or officials, since they were not
compelled to appear, and no personal liability would be created. 29 6
289. Id.
290. 394 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2004).
291. Id. at 921.
292. Id.
293. 316 B.R. 797 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
294. Bankruptcy Code section 547 is one of the sections enumerated in section 106(a)
and allows a bankruptcy trustee or its representative (in this case, the creditors' commit-
tee) to demand return of funds paid by the debtor to a creditor for a pre-bankruptcy debt
within ninety days before the filing of the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000). There are
defenses set forth under section 547 which may well have been available to NYPUC, but the
threshold issue in 360networks was whether the trustee could sue NYPUC, a state agency, for
preference in the first place. See 360networks, 316 B.R. at 799.
295. 360networks, 316 B.R. at 803 (internal citations omitted). A bankruptcy court has
"exclusive jurisdiction" of all property of the debtor and the debtor's estate "wherever lo-
cated." Id. at 803 (citing Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)).
296. Id.
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Rather, "the power of the court [was] limited ... to the disposition of
the property. ' 297 Therefore, since the bankruptcy court has in rem
jurisdiction over the property of the debtor, "it has in remjurisdiction
to decide issues involving that property, notwithstanding a State's sov-
ereign immunity. '2 98 Since there was no pending motion under sec-
tion 550 to compel return of the money, the bankruptcy court could
rule that the transfer was avoidable without ruling at the same time
that New York had to return the money.29 9
360networks was not the first case in which a court confronted the
difference between the authority to declare the status of property of
the estate, and the authority to enforce its declaration against a state.
In Suhar v. Burns (In re Burns),30 0 the court stated, "The fact that avoid-
ance and recovery are distinct does not mean that avoidance cannot
trigger recovery, but it does suggest that avoidance need not always
trigger recovery. '"301 Similarly, in United States Lines, Inc. v. United States
(In re McLean Industries, Inc.), 30 2 the court stated that a bankruptcy
court has power to determine that a transfer is avoidable under sec-
tion 547, even if it lacks power to order affirmative relief.30 3 The bank-
297. Id. (internal citations omitted). A preference claim falls within the bankruptcy
court's in rem jurisdiction because property subject to a preference action is "best under-
stood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred
before the commencement of the bankruptcy." Id.; see also In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.,
836 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988) ("[P]roperty belongs
to the debtor for purposes of section 547 if its transfer will deprive the bankruptcy estate of
something which could otherwise be used to satisfy the claims of creditors."); cf. FDIC v.
Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that in a
preference action, property transferred does not become property of the estate until it is
recovered).
298. 360networks, 316 B.R. at 803, 804; see also Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 577
(1947) (holding that a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction over a debtor's property "is
not limited to the prevention of interference with the use of the debtor's property ... but
it extends also to the adjudication of questions respecting title"); In re N.C. Technical Dev.
Authority, Inc., No. 03-83278C-7D, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1087, at *11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar.
30, 2005) (debtor's adversary proceeding to set aside state corrective deed was solely an in
rem proceeding and not an affront to the sovereignty of the state).
299. 360networks, 316 B.R. at 805.
300. 322 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2003).
301. Id. at 427.
302. 196 B.R. 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
303. Id. at 677. The bankruptcy court in Sticka v. Oregon State Lottery Commission (In re
Judy A. Moore), 323 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005), confronted almost identical facts as the
court in 360networks and reached a different conclusion. As in 360networks, a chapter 7
trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the Oregon State Lottery Commission to
avoid an alleged preferential transfer. 360networks, 316 B.R. at 754. There were two issues:
first, whether section 106(a) was a valid exercise of constitutional authority; and second,
whether the trustee's preference claim could be used to set off a claim for income taxes
filed by the lottery commission against the debtor's estate. Id. at 754-55. As to the first
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ruptcy court in Bliemeister v. Industrial Commission of Arizona (In re
Bliemeister),30 4 however, foresaw the arguments to be made in Katz and
concluded that the states had surrendered their sovereignty to bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction when they ratified the Bankruptcy Clause.
B. Central Virginia Community College v. Katz
When confronted with the ominous prospect of having to order
the NYPUC to actually do something (pay back the debtor's money)
the bankruptcy court in 360networks did what any courageous federal
court would do when faced with a challenge-it left the question for
another court to decide. The issue appeared again two years later in
Katz. Partisans of expanded bankruptcy powers saw a victory for their
view.
Wallace's Bookstores, Inc. ("WBI") is an American saga. The busi-
ness was founded by Wallace G. Wilkinson, who dropped out of col-
lege in 1960 to start a used bookstore. 30 5 WBI ultimately grew into one
of the nation's largest retailers of new and used college textbooks,
with more than ninety-one locations on sixty college campuses around
the country.3 0 6 In 1987, Wilkinson, then a political unknown, used his
issue, the bankruptcy court noted that since Hood had avoided the issue of whether section
106(a) was constitutional, and the Ninth Circuit had previously held that section 106(a)
was unconstitutional as applied to states, the trustee had no authority to bring a preference
avoidance action against the state. Id. As for the setoff claim under section 502(d), the
bankruptcy court found that immunity did not apply, for two reasons. First, setoff is part of
the bankruptcy claims process, a strictly in rem proceeding that does not offend state sover-
eignty. Id. at 756-57. Second, section 502(d) includes a waiver provision whereby if a state
files a proof of claim as a creditor in a bankruptcy case, it waives immunity with respect to
adjudication of that proof of claim, including any defenses or objections to the claim. ld. at
757. Some courts were in agreement with this conclusion. Schlossbera v. Maryland (In re
Creative Goldsmith of D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Congress' effort to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity through its 1994 enactment of 11
U.S.C. § 106(a) is unconstitutional and ineffective."); Heritage Associates v. Maryland (In
re Heritage Associates), 336 B.R. 255 (Bankr. Md. 2006) (finding an avoidance complaint
filed by chapter 11 debtor's plan committee against state agency was barred under the
Eleventh Amendment). Other courts were not in such agreement. Quality Stores, Inc. v.
Vt. Dep't of Taxes (In re Quality Stores, Inc.) 324 B.R. 631, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Mich. 2005)
(noting a split among the circuits on this issue, adopted the Sixth Circuit rule in Hood v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003), to find that
section 106 represented a valid abrogation of state immunity).
304. 251 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D. Az. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 296 F.3d 858 (9th Cir.
2002).
305. W G. Wilkinson, 60, Kentucky Governor Who Faced Scandals, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2002,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A3E7DAI 131F935A35754COA9649C8
B63.
306. Id.;John L. Pulley, Court Divides Up a Bankruptcy Chain of College Bookstores, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., May 4, 2001, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v47/i34/34aO3001.htm.
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considerable financial resources to fund his candidacy in the Demo-
cratic primary for governor of Kentucky, including hiring political
consultant James Carville.30 7 His plan to introduce a state lottery was
popular with voters, and after winning the primary against a field that
included two former Kentucky governors and a former lieutenant gov-
ernor, Wilkinson went on to the defeat the Republican nominee in
the fall election by a landslide.30 8
Ethics concerns, however, soon dogged his administration, which
saw investigations of his overseas business dealings (culminating in an
audit by Italian tax police), state contracts awarded to companies con-
tributing to his wife's political war chest, charges that a company he
owned conspired to buy stolen books, and prison time for his nephew
on corruption charges. 3 09 At that time, the Kentucky Constitution pro-
hibited a governor from serving consecutive terms. 310 Not gauging the
political winds very astutely, Wilkinson pushed for an amendment to
allow gubernatorial succession, grandfathered to include him.
3 1 1
When the General Assembly refused to pass the proposed amend-
ment, Wilkinson's wife, Martha Wilkinson, announced her candidacy
for the 1991 Democratic nomination to replace him, but she withdrew
from the primary.31 2 Diagnosed with lymphoma, Wallace Wilkinson
retired from public life at the end of his term. He died in 2002.313
WBI suffered a similar fall from grace. Once valued at up to $450
million, creditors of the company filed an involuntary chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy petition against WBI on February 5, 2001, seeking immediate
liquidation of the assets of WBI and affiliated companies. 31 4 Two
weeks later, WBI and its subsidiaries filed to convert the cases to volun-
tary chapter 11 cases,jointly administered in the Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky.3 15 A plan of liquidation was ap-
proved a year later, and the bankruptcy court appointed Bernard
307. WALLACE GLENN WILKINSON, You CAN'T Do THAT, GOVERNOR! 24 (1995).
308. Howard Wilkinson & Howard Wolfe, Wallace Wilkinson Dead at 60, CINCINNATI EN-
QUIRER, July 6, 2002, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/07/06/loc-wallace_
wilkinson.html.
309. Kakie Urch,. Scandals Beset Kentucky Governors, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 29,
2002, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/09/29/loc-scandals-beset-ky.html.
310. Wilkinson & Wolfe, supra note 308.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Creditors Question Wilkinson About Bankruptcy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 18, 2001,
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2O01/03/18/loc-creditors-question.html.
315. In re Wallace's Bookstores, Inc., Nos. 01-50545-01-50606, 01-51059-01-51065
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2001) (on file with author).
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Katz, an accountant, to serve as liquidating supervisor to oversee the
orderly liquidation of assets. 3
16
One of Mr. Katz's duties as trustee was to investigate and recover
all "preferential transfers" made by WBI to creditors within the ninety
days immediately preceding the bankruptcy filing. Several hundred of
these "preference" actions were ultimately filed in the case. One of
these was Katz v. Central Virginia Community College, filed on February
12, 2003. 3 17 The complaint alleged that the debtors made preferential
transfers to the college in the amount of $63,387.318 The complaint
demanded that the transfers be avoided pursuant to section 547 of the
Code and recovered by the trustee pursuant to section 550.319
Central Virginia Community College ("CVCC") filed a motion to
dismiss the adversary complaint.3 20 CVCC argued that under the rule
of Seminole Tribe, section 106 was unconstitutional as a violation of
state sovereignty, to which the State of Virginia never consented. 321
The bankruptcy court denied CVCC's motion to dismiss, and the
district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, all on the basis of the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Hood.32 2 The Court granted certiorari in Katz in
order to consider the question left open in Hood: whether Congress's
attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in section 106(a) was
valid.323
In the same way that Seminole Tribe and Alden were premised upon
detailed historical grounds, the majority in Katz took pains to promul-
gate its own careful version of the history of the Bankruptcy Clause
and state immunity. The Court began by noting that bankruptcy juris-
diction "at its core, is in rem."'324 Such jurisdiction "does not implicate
States' sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds ofjurisdic-
tion. ' '32 5 Still, in modern times as well as in the eighteenth century,
the jurisdiction of courts in adjudicating rights to property of a bank-
316. Order Confirming Second Amended Joint Consolidated Plan of Liquidation of
Wallace's Bookstores, Inc., In re Wallace's Bookstores, Inc., No. 01-50545 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
filed Mar. 20, 2002) (on file with author).
317. Complaint for Damages, Katz v. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (No.
01-50545) (on file with author).
318. Id. at 5.
319. Id.
320. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Complaint, Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (No. 01-50545)
(on file with author).
321. Id. at 3-4.
322. Katz, 546 U.S. at 356 (2006).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 362 (citing Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947)).
325. Id. at 361 (citing Tennessee v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450-51 (2004)).
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rupt estate must naturally include "the power to issue compulsory or-
ders to facilitate the administration and distribution of the res. 3
2 6
The Court presumed that the Framers were familiar with the con-
temporary legal context at the time they adopted the Bankruptcy
Clause, 327 and that the Framers drafted the Bankruptcy Clause with
full knowledge of what was necessary to create an effective national
bankruptcy regime. Thus, the Court concluded that in ratifying the
Constitution, the States abrogated their sovereign immunity to the ex-
tent necessary to implement that regime. 328
The Court then surveyed the status of bankruptcy before the
Constitution to support its interpretation that the Framers intended
to imbue the Bankruptcy Clause with broad powers in order to effec-
tuate a national bankruptcy regime. For example, the Court noted the
disparate results of James v. Allen3 29 and Millar v. Hall,3 30 which posed
a genuine impediment to travel and commerce in the early
republic. 33 1
It was against this backdrop that the Framers agreed that Con-
gress should have the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies." 332 Although the Framers' immediate interest may
have been to avoid unjust imprisonment for debt and to make federal
bankruptcy discharge enforceable in every state, "the power granted
to Congress by that Clause is a unitary concept rather than an amal-
gam of discrete segments." 333 Thus, the Framers realized that an effec-
tive bankruptcy regime would require more than "simple
adjudications of rights in the res. ' ' 33 4 English law, for example, as well
as the first United States bankruptcy law, gave courts and commission-
ers the power to force third parties to turn over property of the estate
and to issue writs of habeas corpus directing states to release debtors
from prison.3 3 5 Accordingly, "those who crafted the Bankruptcy
Clause would have understood it to give Congress the power to au-
thorize courts to avoid preferential transfers and to recover the trans-
ferred property."33 6 To the extent that such powers ancillary to the
326. Id. at 362.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 362-63.
329. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 188 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1786).
330. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 229 (Pa. 1788).
331. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
332. Katz, 546 U.S. at 370.
333. Id,
334. Id.
335. Id. at 372.
336. Id.
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bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction may infringe upon state sover-
eign immunity, "the States agreed in the plan of the Convention not
to assert that immunity. '" 3 37
As further proof that the states consented to broad abrogation of
immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause, the Court noted that the Act
of 1800, the country's first bankruptcy law, included a provision grant-
ing federal courts the power to issue habeas corpus writs directing
states to release imprisoned debtors.338 This was extremely significant
since Congress passed the Act of 1800 just five years after the ratifica-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798, when national sentiment
was strongly in favor of states' rights. Yet there was no objection to the
bankruptcy legislation or grant of habeas corpus based upon infringe-
ment of sovereign immunity. In addition, section 62 of the Act of 1800
specifically exempted debts owed to the United States, "or to any of
them" from bankruptcy discharge. 339 The fact that the statute had to
expressly carve out this exemption in favor of states suggests that states
were otherwise assumed to be fully subject to the Act of 1800.340
Taken together, the Court reached the "ineluctable conclusion" that
"States acquiesced in a subordination of whatever sovereign immunity
they might otherwise have asserted in proceedings necessary to effec-
tuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.'" 34 1 In light of
this history, the enactment of section 106(a) "was not necessary to au-
thorize the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction over these preference
avoidance proceedings. 342
The Court endeavored to clarify that the decision does "not mean
to suggest that every law labeled a 'bankruptcy law' could, consistent
with the Bankruptcy Clause, properly impinge upon state sovereign
immunity."3 43 Presumably, the door was open for review of bank-
ruptcy laws in the future. The Court's decision was that under the
authority of the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress could determine
whether states should be amenable to such proceedings.344
In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that nothing in Article I indi-
cates an intention to abrogate state sovereignty.3 45 Citing Seminole
337. Id.
338. Id. at 375.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 375-77.
341. Id. at 377-78.
342. Id. at 362.
343. Id. at 378 n.15.
344. Id. at 362.
345. Id. at 381.
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Tribe and Alden, he found no reason to override "settled doctrine" that
Article I "cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction. '346 Judge Thomas also found fault
with the Court's historical review, opining that the scant attention
paid to bankruptcy language in adopting the Constitution, and the
twelve-year delay in passing the first national bankruptcy law after the
Constitution was ratified, indicate that there was very little concern in
the early republic for a national bankruptcy law.34 7 As for uniformity,
the remedy intended by the Framers to redress the refusal of one state
to recognize a bankruptcy discharge from another state is the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,3 48 not the authorization of private suits
against the States.349 Finally, Justice Thomas found disingenuous the
Court's determination that recovery of assets under section 550 was
properly ancillary to in rem authority.350 For Thomas, the result of
Katz was to effectively overrule Seminole Tribe. "That would be wrong,"
he concluded, "but at least the terms of our disagreement would be
transparent. '351
Katz is not a direct refutation of Seminole Tribe. Seminole Tribe held
that sovereign immunity is abrogated if a state consents to suit or if
Congress abrogates it by an express statement made pursuant to a
valid grant of congressional power. 352 Rather than moor its decision
on a finding that section 106 is constitutionally valid, the Katz Court
found that Florida had consented to suit under the Code through rati-
fication of the Bankruptcy Clause. 353
The Katz decision has been followed in subsequent cases. In Chat-
tanooga State Technical Community College v. Johnson (In re North American
Royalties, Inc.), 354 the bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a
bankruptcy preference claim, finding that as determined in Katz, the
state of Tennessee gave up its right to assert sovereign immunity to
preference suits when it ratified the Bankruptcy Clause. 355 In Florida
Department of Revenue v. Omine (In re Omine),356 the district court af-
346. Id. at 381 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 385-86.
348. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
349. Katz, 546 U.S. at 390-91.
350. Id. at 393.
351. Id.
352. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996).
353. Katz, 546 U.S. at 375-77.
354. No. 1:05-cv-91, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13034 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 10, 2006).
355. Id. at *10-*1].
356. No. 6:05-cv-1633-Orl-31DAB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8396 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 10,
2006).
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firmed the bankruptcy court award of damages and sanctions against
the Florida Department of Revenue ("DOR"), after the DOR repeat-
edly violated the automatic stay by attempting to collect a debt for
repayment of public assistance money paid to the debtor's ex-wife and
children.3 57 As sanctions for its violation of the stay, however, the
bankruptcy court discharged the remainder of the debt owed to the
DOR and ordered it to pay the debtor $1000 in fines and $1600 for his
attorneys fees. 358 Citing Katz, the district court held that actions to
force a creditor to honor the automatic stay are necessary to enforce
the bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction. 359
IV. Conclusion: What Will Katz Drag In? The Future of State
Sovereignty in Bankruptcy
State law will continue to act as the primary substantive law of
bankruptcy, both because as a practical matter, there is little federal
common law, and because many provisions of the Code expressly in-
corporate state substantive law. In this sense, state sovereignty largely
prevails. State authority, however, gives way to bankruptcy jurisdiction
in three situations: (1) when federal bankruptcy law preempts state
insolvency law under the Supremacy Clause; (2) when a state law that
is not specifically a bankruptcy law has the effect of preempting fed-
eral bankruptcy law; and (3) when state sovereignty is abrogated be-
cause it conflicts with provisions of federal bankruptcy law. Under the
present Code, the restrictions on state sovereignty are set forth in sec-
tion 106.360 The rationale behind these restrictions is to eliminate the
difference between state and non-state actors for purposes of defining
property of the bankruptcy estate and administering the estate.
The first two elements are firmly established in American consti-
tutional law. However, given the debate within the Court, as character-
ized by the opposing-and slim-majorities in Seminole Tribe and Katz,
abrogation of state immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause is clearly
not as established under the law. For the majority in Seminole Tribe
(and like-minded jurists), the boundary between state sovereignty and
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is fixed-the reach of bankruptcy law
ends where the state becomes subject to suit for any reason, whether
in bankruptcy court or elsewhere, except pursuant to the Fourteenth
357. Id. at *8.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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Amendment. 36 1 In contrast, the majority in Katz concluded that states
surrendered their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Bank-
ruptcy Clause. The Katz decision suggests that in the future, any exer-
cise of bankruptcy jurisdiction over the state can be defended upon
the principal that such jurisdiction is ancillary to the purposes of the
bankruptcy power.
Katz abrogates state immunity as to the process of bankruptcy.
This very fact is itself abhorrent to the majority in Seminole Tribe. The
rule in Katz, however, is not likely to cause a fundamental change in
the process or substance of bankruptcy. Katz does not create any new
rights under state law. For example, by filing bankruptcy, a debtor
does not suddenly gain the right to sue a state for a tort liability that
would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity under nonban-
kruptcy law. Where a cause of action arises solely under state law, it
does not offend the preemption doctrine to bar suits against state
actors.
A tort, or any other state-based cause of action, is fundamentally
different from a 'cause of action that exists only in bankruptcy and
would not exist but for bankruptcy, such as preference avoidance ac-
tions, turnover proceedings, or discharge litigation. Where the juris-
dictional basis is bankruptcy law, the rule from Katz is that sovereign
immunity cannot be used to differentiate a state actor from a non-
state actor.3 6 2 Thus, Katz will most heavily impact the procedural as-
pects of bankruptcy, and not the substantive aspects.
To be sure, Katz is radical because it sweeps away a state's defense
to a bankruptcy action. It establishes a fundamental exception to the
Eleventh Amendment, similar to Ex parte Young,3 63 and one that will
be used far more frequently. But no substantive rights will be created
by Katz. The case of Dairy Mart364 is an example of this. The right to an
environmental clean-up subsidy from the State of Kentucky was strictly
a state-law right-it was not a right that arose because of the debtor's
bankruptcy, nor was it a cause of action created by any surrender of
state sovereignty. The law of Kentucky already provided the subsidy-
the debtor was merely late in filing for it under the state law.3 65 Bank-
ruptcy law intervened only to enforce the Code provision of tolling a
361. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
362. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 235-50 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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regulatory statute for sixty days. 366 The decision in Dairy Mart did not
create an interest that would otherwise not have existed.
Nor is the Katz decision at odds with the thoughtful opinion of
Justice Sutherland in Continental Bank v. Rock Island Railway Co., 3 6 7
who reviewed the several bankruptcy acts and codes enacted since the
ratification of the Constitution, and concluded:
Taken altogether, they demonstrate in a very striking way the ca-
pacity of the bankruptcy clause to meet new conditions as they
have been disclosed as a result of the tremendous growth of busi-
ness and development of human activities from 1800 to the present
day. And these acts, far-reaching though they be, have not gone
beyond the limit of congressional power; but rather have consti-
tuted extensions into a field whose boundaries may not yet be fully
revealed. 3 68
Katz, monumental as it is, is just a part of that "revealing" process.
Moreover, given the disparity in views regarding the limits of sover-
eignty when confronted by bankruptcy law, it is certainly not the last
extension into this uncertain and controversial field.
366. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
367. 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
368. Id. at 671.
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